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Abstract
Part I of this Note examines the EEC’s plan to establish a unified European capital market
by 1992 and introduces the proposed directive. Part II discusses the current status of insider
trading regulations in the Member States and focuses primarily on legislation in France and the
United Kingdom. Part III analyzes the proposed directive and provides a brief comparison to
the current U.S. regulatory framework. This Note concludes that the Commission’s proposed
directive provides a workable framework for formulating uniform regulations. However, if the ban
on insider trading in the Community is to be effective, the proposal will have to mandate stronger
mechanisms for enforcement.
NOTE
TOWARD THE UNIFICATION OF EUROPEAN CAPITAL
MARKETS: THE EEC'S PROPOSED DIRECTIVE
ON INSIDER TRADING
INTRODUCTION
The growing internationalization of the world's capital
markets has made market surveillance and the enforcement of
securities regulations more difficult.' Recent insider trading
scandals have emphasized the urgent need to safeguard the in-
tegrity of globalized securities trading. 2 In an international
market, nations and securities markets must cooperate to en-
sure equivalent regulatory treatment and to expedite the en-
forcement of fraudulent and illegal transactions.
In April 1987 the Commission of the European Commu-
nity' ("EEC" or "Community") adopted a proposal aimed at
establishing uniform legislation coordinating insider trading
regulations among the EEC Member States. The proposal,
which is subject to Council approval, is patterned on existing
legislation in France and the United Kingdom and is part of a
master plan designed to create a unified financial market in the
1. Internationalization of the Securities Market, Exchange Act Release No.
21,958, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,759, at 87,393
(Apr. 18, 1985).
2. In 1986 American arbitrageur Ivan Boesky was linked to the British Guinness
Company scandal, which centered on that company's illegal payments to investors in
return for the purchase of large blocks of stock so as to increase its bid in a takeover
offer. U.K. Launches an Investigation into Guinness, Wall St.J., Dec. 2, 1986, at 37, col. 1.
In 1986 Guinness Company reported taking a US$200,000,000 charge related partly
to its involvement with Boesky. Guinness Takes $200M Charge Due to Boesky, Newsday,
Apr. 24, 1987, at 45, col. 1.
Perhaps more significant is the recent decision of Israeli businessman David
Sofer to cooperate in an international insider trading scheme involving high-ranking
former Merrill Lynch official Nahum Vaskevitch. Allegedly, Vaskevitch leaked "confi-
dential information about numerous transactions involving Merrill Lynch clients" to
the Israeli. Hertzberg, Israeli Will Aid Trading Inquiry, Sources Assert, Wall St. J., July 2,
1987, at 3, col. 4.
3. The EEC currently comprises twelve Member States: Belgium, Denmark,
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. See Treaty Between the Member States
of the European Communities and the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Repub-
lic to the European Economic Community and to the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity, O.J. L 302/9 (1985), 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 101, at 114-15.
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Community by 1992. 4
This Note argues that uniform insider trading laws in the
EEC are essential to ensure maximum investor protection in its
unified financial market. Part I of this Note examines the
EEC's plan to establish a unified European capital market by
1992 and introduces the proposed directive. Part II discusses
the current status of insider trading regulations in the Member
States and focuses primarily on legislation in France and the
United Kingdom. Part III analyzes the proposed directive and
provides a brief comparison to the current U.S. regulatory
framework. This Note concludes that the Commission's pro-
posed directive provides a workable framework for formulating
uniform regulations. However, if the ban on insider trading in
the Community is to be effective, the proposal will have to
mandate stronger mechanisms for enforcement.
I. EEC PLAN TO CREATE A UNIFIED FINANCIAL MARKET
The Commission's proposal on insider trading is part of a
larger program being implemented with a view toward estab-
lishing a Community-wide financial market.5 The Treaty of
Rome6 calls for the removal of all restrictions on the move-
ment of capital in the Community. This so-called liberalization
of capital is designed to establish a free internal capital mar-
ket.7 The European Single Act has since targeted completion
4. Unified Financial Market: The European Commission Proposes EEC Standards Against
Insider Trading Operations on the Stock Exchanges, E.C. BULL. No. 4539 (new Series), at 9
(Apr. 29, 1987). The proposed directive will now have to be reviewed by the Euro-
pean Parliament and by the Social and Economic Committee and it is expected to be
issued officially sometime in 1988. If such is the case, Member States will have until
1992 to implement the legislation. De Bandt, Van Hecke & Lagae, Recent Belgian
and European Community Law, Vol. I, No. 4, at 1 (May 1987) (newsletter).
5. Proposal for a Council Directive Coordinating Regulations on Insider Trad-
ing, COM(87) 111 final, at 3, Common Mkt. Rep. 10,880, at 12,126 (May 21, 1987)
[hereinafter COM(87) 111 final].
6. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II) (official English trans.), 298 U.N.T.S. 11
(1958) (unofficial English trans.) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
7. The EEC has invoked this "right of establishment" to develop its Company
Law Harmonization Program, which is designed to protect employees, shareholders,
and the general public against corporate misconduct. The Commission has formu-
lated a number of directives dealing with this subject and the Council has adopted
several directives aimed at coordinating the Member State's laws. Correlator, Free
Movement of Persons-Business-Capital, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1000, at 1008.
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of this unified market for 1992.8
A. Globalization
The economic growth of advanced industrial nations,
the expanding needs of multinational corporations, and the
severe indebtedness of third world nations have all contributed
to an overwhelming demand for capital throughout the world.9
Securities are now being traded simultaneously on a variety of
national exchanges.' 0 Spurred by high-tech computers and
old-fashioned greed, trading volumes have soared and finan-
cial deregulation and experimentation have extended into
worldwide capital markets." The development of the
Eurobond market has provided new sources of capital to both
U.S. and non-U.S. companies. 2 Eurobonds totalled 135.4 bil-
lion issues during 1985, nearly nine times the 1983 total, with
the first three months of 1986 setting a record of 146.7 bil-
lion." The annual trading volume has increased sevenfold
over the last five years to an estimated 1.5 trillion.' 4 The
world's financial markets have also witnessed several multina-
tional equity offerings. The US$7.96 billion British Gas mul-
tinational offering of December 8, 1986, was the largest equity
underwriting in history.' 5 As a result of this growth, investors
are increasingly purchasing foreign securities and national ex-
changes are taking steps to accommodate this new era of
8. Single European Act art. 13, O.J. L 169/1, at 7 (1987).
9. See Gill, The Emerging Global Equity Market: Dimensions and Issues, 4 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 1, 39-53 (1986).
10. Internationalization of the Securities Markets, supra note 1, [1984-1985
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,759, at 87,393.
11. Bianco, Must the Panic Get Worse to Spark Reform?, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 9, 1987, at
46.
12. Ketchum, Internationalization of the Securities Markets, in INTERNATIONAL SECUR-
ITIES ACTIVITIES OF BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND COMPANIES 4 (E. Greene, R.
Ketchum & L. Quinn chairmen 1987).
13. Id.
14. Id. The success of the Eurobond market has since led to the development of
a Euroequity market, which provides the international financial community with an
equity-raising vehicle. In the first five months of 1986, there were 23 euroequity
offerings in the U.S. totaling US$1.7 billion. Id. at 6. Canadian and European issuers
were the front-runners in this market. Id. The U.S., has recently begun participating
on a regular basis, issuing US$122.4 million in 1985 and over US$605 million in the
first half of 1986. Id.
15. Id. at 5.
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globalized trading. 16
The international investor is afforded varying degrees of
protection throughout the world. Insider trading regulations
range from strict legislation to complete absence of formal re-
strictions. This lack of uniformity has led to serious enforce-
ment problems.' 7 For instance, nonpublic sensitive informa-
tion concerning a U.S. issuer may not be deemed inside infor-
mation in another nation. If a non-U.S. resident in possession
of such information effects a transaction in a U.S. security
through his or her national market, U.S. regulatory officials
may be hindered by the other country's application of its own
securities laws. 18
The United States and the United Kingdom have recently
addressed this issue. The British Department of Trade and In-
dustry ("DTI"), the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"), and the U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Commis-
sion have agreed to cooperate in monitoring insider trading
and other securities fraud on their exchanges. 9 In 1977, the
EEC also established a Code of Conduct that recommended
similar cooperation in investigating suspected cases of insider
trading in the Member States.z0 If the EEC can effectively co-
ordinate the insider trading regulations of its Member States
through this proposed directive, the world's financial markets
will be that much closer to global cooperation.
16. Id.
17. See Grass, Internationalization of Securities Markets, 9 HOUSTON INT'L LJ. 17, 18
(1986).
18. Id. at 49.
19. Memorandum of Understanding on Exchange of Information Between the
SEC, CFTC, and the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry in Matters
Relating to Securities and Futures, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,027 (Sept. 23, 1986). Recently, a British High Court ruled that a London
journalist was not obligated to divulge to government inspectors the sources of his
two accurate predictions as to the government's disposition of reviewed takeover
bids. Lindsay v. Warner, slip op. (C.A. May 6, 1987) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases
file). It has been argued that this decision has impaired British investigatory efforts
in security fraud cases and, in turn, has hampered future American requests for infor-
mation under this accord. See Note, The British-U.S. Memorandum of Understanding of
1986: Implications After Warner, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 110 (1987).
20. O.J. L 212/37 (1977). The Code was recommended to the Community in
1977. Id. Rule 9 of the Code prohibits transactions conducted on the basis of inside
information. Id.
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B. The Commission's Proposed Directive Coordinating Insider
Trading Regulations In The EEC
The EEC's proposed directive on insider trading is based
on the premise that the proper functioning of the securities
markets depends on the degree of confidence that they inspire
in investors. 2' Because the prices quoted should reflect the
true factors of supply and demand, all possible measures must
be taken to ensure equal access to any relevant information re-
garding a company or its stock.22 Consistent with this policy,
the proposal is designed to provide an essential supplement to
directives in the securities area that have already been adopted
or are under consideration by the Council. 23
The proposed directive on insider trading is designed to
cover a broad category of "insiders." It applies to "primary
insiders," namely, those who obtain privileged information in
the context of their function or profession, as well as to "sec-
ondary insiders," or "tippees," who knowingly receive privi-
21. COM(87) Ill final, supra note 5, at 2, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,880,
at 12,126.
22. Id. at 1, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,880, at 12,126.
23. Id. at 3, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,880, at 12,126. In March 1979, the
Council passed Directive No. 79/279 to coordinate the conditions for the admission
of securities to official stock exchange listings. Council Directive No. 79/279, OJ. L
66/21 (1979), 1 Common Mkt. Rep. 1721. The Council Directive is the most com-
mon type of EEC legislation. The Commission is responsible for introducing a pro-
posal for consideration as a directive. The Treaty of Rome mandates that the Coun-
cil consult the Assembly and the Economic and Social Committee before considering
the Commission's proposal. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 193,298 U.N.T.S. at 79.
Once a proposal is adopted as a directive, the Member States usually have a period of
two years to comply. If a Member State fails to comply, the Court of Justice will
order compliance. Cruickshank, Insider Trading and the EEC, 10 INT'L Bus. L. 345
(1982).
Other directives include Directive No. 80/390 to coordinate the requirements
for the drafting, scrutiny, and distribution of the listing particulars that must be pub-
lished in order for a security to be admitted to an official exchange. O.J. L 100/1
(1980), 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1731. In 1982, the Council issued Directive
No. 82/121, which requires companies that have shares listed on an official stock
exchange to publish information on a regular basis. OJ. 48/26 (1982); 1 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1741. Finally, in 1985 the Commission submitted a proposal for
a directive requiring companies to publish major changes in the ownership of their
capital. The Council has to formally address this proposal. Proposal for a Council
Directive on Information to be Published when Major Holdings in the Capital of a
Listed Company are Acquired or Disposed of, COM(85) 795 final, OJ. C 351/35
(1985).
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leged information from a primary insider. 24
The term "privileged information" is defined by the pro-
posed directive as information that is confidential or nonpub-
lic, specific in nature, and is likely to have a material effect on
the quotation of a security once it is publicly disclosed.25 This
information must also "relate to one or more issuers of securi-
ties or to one or more securities."26
Insiders are prohibited from taking advantage of such in-
formation by directly buying or selling a listed security, and are
also forbidden from engaging in off-market transactions that
are carried out through a professional intermediary, such as a
bank, stockholder, or dealer. 27 Insiders may disclose privi-
leged information only if it is necessary to do so in the course
of their profession or duties. 28 Finally, a ban is imposed on the
practice of "tipping," which prohibits an insider from recom-
mending a listed security to a third party on the basis of inside
information 29
To detect violations of insider trading and to identify
those responsible for such violations, the proposed directive
stipulates that each Member State must designate authorities
to monitor the application of the proposal's provisions.30 In
addition, the directive provides for the establishment of a Con-
tact Committee at the Community level, which would organize
an institutionalized exchange of information between the
Member States to suggest additional measures to combat in-
sider trading. 3' The EEC first adopted Contact Committees in
the directives containing rules for admission to the stock ex-
changes.32 These committees are composed of persons ap-
pointed by the Member States and representatives of the Com-
24. COM(87) 111 final, supra note 5, at 4, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,880,
at 12,126.
25. Id. at 5, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,880, at 12,126.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 5-6, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,880, at 12,126.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 6, Common Mkt. Rep., (CCH) 110,880, at 12,126.
30. Id.
31. Id at 9, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,880, at 12,126-27.
32. See Council Directive No. 79/279, art. 20, Oj. L 66/21, at 24-25 (1979), 1
Common Mkt. Rep. 1752A (designated art. 25). Article 20 of this directive de-
scribes the function of the Contact Committee as facilitating the harmonized imple-
mentation of the directive through regular consultations on any practical problems
arising from its application and on which exchanges of view are deemed useful. Id.
19881
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mission who serve as chairpersons.
The EEC's proposed directive establishes basic standards.
Member States may establish stricter national rules provided
that these rules do not favor one state over another.3 4 How-
ever, since the proposal does not include sanctions, each Mem-
ber State is to mandate its own form of punishment. 5
II. INSIDER REGULATIONS IN THE MEMBER
STATES TODAY
A review of the current status of insider trading regula-
tions in the Community reveals marked differences among the
Member States. At present, only the United Kingdom, France,
and Denmark have enacted official insider trading statutes.
The Federal Republic of Germany, however, has introduced a
comprehensive set of voluntary rules prohibiting the exploita-
tion of inside information. Belgium, the Netherlands, and Ire-
land have formulated proposed legislation. The remaining
Member States have left insider trading virtually unregulated.
A. Existing Laws: The United Kingdom, France, Denmark, and the
Federal Republic of Germany
1. The United Kingdom
Insider trading was not a crime in the U.K. until 1980.36
In 1985 the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 37 (the
"1985 Act") was passed to strengthen prosecutorial powers by
imposing criminal sanctions on those convicted of insider trad-
ing in listed and advertised securities. This legislation was
amended by the Financial Services Act in 19868 and may in-
33. Id.
34. E.C. BULL. No. 4539 (new series), at 9 (Apr. 29, 1987). As a matter of princi-
pie, the Commission considers the penal law an exclusive perogative of each Member
State. De Bandt, Van Hecke & Lague, supra note 4, at 2. Thus, a Member State may
only decide to provide for civil sanctions in its legislation. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Read, How To Avoid Going Inside, Bus., Dec. 1986, at 32. Insider trading in
the United Kingdom is commonly referred to as insider dealing. Id.
37. Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, ch. 8.
38. Financial Services Act 1986, ch. 60. The 1985 Act, ch. 8, supplanted the
Companies Act 1981, ch. 62, regarding securities fraud, and the 1986 Financial Serv-
ices Act, ch. 60, elaborated on these violations.
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elude civil sanctions.39
The 1985 Act addresses dealings on the National Stock
Exchange. However, certain off-market deals are also scruti-
nized. These include "advertised securities" through a profes-
sional dealer on the over-the-counter market, and dealings on
recognized investment exchanges established under the Finan-
cial Services Act."°
The 1985 Act defines an insider as any individual who has
been knowingly connected with a company during the prior six
months and who holds information: (a) by virtue of his rela-
tionship with the company; (b) that it would be reasonable to
expect him not to disclose; and (c) that he knows is nonpublic
and price-sensitive." The definition is also extended to secon-
dary insiders or tippees who receive information from primary
insiders in connection with a business or professional relation-
ship that they suspect should not be disclosed. 2
The definition of "price-sensitive information" is made up
of three components. First, the information must relate to spe-
cific matters concerning the company.43 Second, the informa-
tion must be likely to affect the price of a company's security if
disclosed. 4" Finally, the information must not be generally
known to those who are likely to deal in the company's securi-
ties .45
Generally, an exchange or takeover panel will first conduct
an investigation when insider trading is suspected and then
turn over the results to the Department of Trade and Indus-
try.46 If there is enough evidence to warrant a public prosecu-
tion, the DTI will forward the matter to the Director of Public
Prosecutions for official consent. 7
An individual who violates the 1985 Act faces imprison-
39. Financial Services Act 1986, ch. 60, § 62; see Read, supra note 36, at 32 (ex-
plaining section 62).
40. Financial Services Act 1986, ch. 60, § 174(3).
41. Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, ch. 8, § 1. See generally J.
ROBINSON, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW AND PRACTICE (1985).
42. J. ROBINSON, supra note 41, at 264-65.
43. Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, ch. 8, § 10(a).
44. Id. § 10(b).
45. Id. § 10(b).
46. Id. § 10(b).
47. Id. § 8(2).
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ment for a term not exceeding two years and/or a fine.4 8 The
opportunity to seize all of the insider's profits is not excluded
because the English courts have general power to award com-
pensation in criminal proceedings. 49 In addition, the Financial
Services Act of 1986 creates new opportunities for investors
wishing to bring an action for damages. The Act permits civil
actions by any party that has suffered a loss as a result of a
contravention of the rules made by regulatory authorities and
any of the self-regulating organizations.50
Britain's new laws were tested for the first time in
July1987, when Geoffrey Collier, a director of London's Mor-
gan Grenfell PLC securities unit, was convicted of insider trad-
ing.5 Collier had traded stock in AE PLC and Cadbury
Scweppes PLC with the nonpublic knowledge that each of
these companies was a possible target of Morgan Grenfell cli-
52ents. Much to the public's surprise, Collier drew the lenient
penalty of a one-year suspended sentence and a fine of
US$40,450.53
2. France
In France, two types of individuals are prohibited from in-
sider trading: "direct" and "indirect" insiders. 54 Direct insid-
ers include the chairman/president, the general managers,
members of the executive committee, the board of directors
and their representatives, and the spouses of such officials.55
Indirect insiders include all individuals who, as a result of their
48. Id. § 8(i) (a); see Civil Liability Under the Financial Services Act, INT'L FIN. L. REV.,
July 1987, at 6. According to Kate Mortimor, the Head of Policy at the Securities and
Investments Board, the British investment firms are verging on a state of paranoia,
fearing all kinds of "malicious civil actions." Civil Liability Under the Financial Services
Act, supra, at 6. They appear to be particularly worried about rules that may be too
subjective, such as those requiring firms to use best efforts. Id.
49. Civil Liability Under the Financial Services Act, supra note 48, at 6.
50. Financial Services Act 1986, ch. 60, § 174(3).
51. Forman, Lenient Penalty in Insider Trading Case Threatens UK. Crackdown's Credi-
bility, Wall St. J., July 6, 1987, at 8, col. d. In delivering the sentence, Judge Far-
quharson said that Collier was a "first time offender" and should not be made a
scapegoat for all of London's financial misconduct. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Law No. 70-1208, Dec. 23, 1970, art. 4, 1970Journal Officiel de la Repub-
lique Francaise [J.O:] 11,981; seeJ. ROBINSON, supra note 41, at 127.
55. 1967 Dalloz-Sirey, Legislation [D.S.L.] 42 (adding Art. 162-1 to Law No. 66-
537, July 24, 1966, 1966J.O. 6402).
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profession, have access to privileged information about a com-
pany or its securities.56 Unlike the EEC's proposed directive
and British law, the French regulations do not include tippees
outside the insider's immediate family. 57 However, those in-
siders who knowingly allow someone else to take advantage of
price-sensitive information are also guilty of a penal viola-
tion.58
Information that has not been made sufficiently public and
that refers to the technical, commercial, or financial state of a
company is considered "price-sensitive privileged informa-
tion."' 59 In addition, the Paris Cour d'appel has ruled that
trading is prohibited only when the information is "precise,
special and certain." 60
The Commission des Operations de Bourse ("COB"), an
authoritative body that supervises the French securities ex-
changes, is not permitted by law to introduce proceedings or
appear as plaintiff in actions regarding securities violations. 6'
Thus, when the COB suspects that insider trading has oc-
curred, it turns the investigation over to the public prosecu-
tor.6 2
Anyone convicted of insider trading in France faces a max-
imum prison term of two years and/or a fine ranging from Ffr.
6,000 to Ffr. 5,000,000.63 The fine may be increased to four
times the amount of profit when that profit exceeds the statu-
tory fine.6 4
In 1967 the COB was created to oversee Paris's capital
markets. The COB was relatively inactive until the Socialist
government gave it new muscle. 65 In April 1984, the COB in-
56. 1971 D.S.L. 17 (adding Art. 10-1 to Ordinance No. 67-833, Sept. 28, 1967,
1967 J.O. 9589) [hereinafter Art. 10-1].
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Note, Insider Trading and the EEC. Harmonization of the Insider Trading Laws of
the Member States, 8 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 151, 172 (1985) (citing Art. 10-1, supra
note 56).
60. Id. at 173 (citingJudgment of May 26, 1977, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1978Juris-
Classeur Periodique No. 18,789 (2d case)).
61. J. ROBINSON, supra note 41, at 128.
62. Id.
63. Art. 10-1, supra note 56; seeJ. ROBINSON, supra note 41, at 128.
64. Art. 10-1, supra note 56; seeJ. ROBINSON, supra note 41, at 128.
65. Karel & Sygma, France's Securities Watchdog Growls at Insiders, Bus. WEEK, Nov.
19, 1984, at 142. In an effort to develop the French economy, the French govern-
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vestigated a run-up in the share price of French arms manufac-
turer Thomson-CSF.66 The surge occurred ten days before
the government-controlled company won a US$4.2 billion
contract from Saudi Arabia.67 The investigation led to the
criminal indictment of a top French Defense Ministry official. 68
The French officials have since recognized the need to police
the Bourse in an effort to attract more foreign investors.69
3. Denmark
Insider trading legislation was introduced in Denmark in
June 1986 as part of the country's new stock exchange rules.
The legislation does not distinguish between insiders and out-
siders and is designed to reach "anyone who trades on infor-
mation about a company or its stock that has not yet been
made public." 70
Violators face criminal penalties of a fine of an unlimited
amount.7 ' The legislation will be enforced by the Stock Ex-
change in Copenhagen, which will further all suspected cases
to the Bank Inspectorate.72
4. The Federal Republic of Germany
In 1970 the Federal Republic of Germany devised a volun-
tary set of Insider Trading Guidelines, which were amended in
1976.73 Semi-Official Commentaries and a Code of Procedure
were adopted along with the Guidelines and were subse-
quently revised in 1976. 74
Insiders and third parties "on an equal footing" may not
ment has begun a privatization program in which it is offering equity securities of 65
state-owned companies over the next five years to provide French companies freer
rein to compete internationally. Greenhouse, France Embraces Popular Capitalism, N.Y.
Times, June 8, 1987, at D10, col. 1.
66. Karel & Sygma, supra note 65.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Telephone interview with Klaus Struwe, Secretary General of the Stockbro-
kers Association of Copenhagen (Nov. 13, 1987) (author's notes on file at the Ford-
ham International Law Journal office).
72. Id.
73. Hopt, The German Insider Trading Guidelines-Spring Gun or Scarecrow? 8 J.
CoMp. Bus. & CAPITAL MARKETS L. 381, 382 (1986).
74. Hopt, supra note 73, at 391.
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engage in insider trading or cause transactions to be effected
in securities while exploiting privileged information that they
have obtained via their positions.7 5
Insiders include: (a) legal representatives and members of
the supervisory board of the company; (b) any such repre-
sentatives of connected domestic companies; (c) domestic
shareholders, including their legal representatives and
supervisory board members, where they have more than a
twenty-five percent interest in the company; and
(d) employees of the company and of domestic companies
connected with it and twenty-five percent shareholders in
connected domestic companies. 7
6
Third parties "on an equal footing" with insiders include
"banks, their supervisory board members, managing directors
and employees, who ...are brought in and thereby obtain
knowledge of inside information." There is no mention of
tippees in these rules because of the contractual nature of com-
pliance.78
The Insider Trading Guidelines are currently enforced by
review boards established at the various German stock ex-
changes.79 Once the board holds a hearing, an outside panel
appointed by the committee begins the investigations.8 0 These
investigators include accountants, auditors, or members of
management. 8 At the principal hearing all the facts are evalu-
ated and a formal decision is rendered. 2 The review panels,
however, do not have the authority to determine the type of
legal sanctions that should be imposed.83
A company wishing to bring an action for damages must
be able to produce the contract that recognizes the insider's
submission to the Insider Trading Guidelines. 4
75. Insider Trading Guidelines § 2 (G. Wegen trans. 1985), reprinted inJ. ROBIN-
SON, supra note 41, at 108 [hereinafter Insider Trading Guidelines].
76. Id. § 2, reprinted inJ. ROBINSON, supra note 41, at 108.
77. Id. § 2, reprinted in J. ROBINSON, supra note 41, at 109.
78. Hopt, supra note 73, at 384.
79. Insider Trading Guidelines, supra note 75, § 3, reprinted in J. ROBINSON, supra
note 41, at 109.
80. Hopt, supra note 73, at 390-91.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Hopt, supra note 73, at 388.
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The principal sanction requires the wrongdoer to return
all pecuniary profits to the company that has been damaged by
the insider's transactions."s This includes all asset advantages
obtained from the violation, including avoided losses to the
company.8 6
In February 1987, West Germany's largest shareholders
association called for a tightening of the country's rules on in-
sider trading.8 7 Nearly 100 out of the 480 companies quoted
on the eight German bourses still have not accepted the volun-
tary rules on insider trading.8 The insider trading case involv-
ing AEG, a German electrical engineering group, illustrates
the need for mandatory legislation.8 9 In 1985, AEG's former
supervisory board chairman purchased shares of AEG during
takeover talks with Daimler.90 After Daimler's bid for AEG he
sold the stock for a profit. 91 Once the Frankfurt Stock Ex-
change discovered his actions, he was forced to pay US$16,000
and resigned from his position at AEG.9 2
B. Proposed Legislation: The Netherlands, Belgium, and Ireland
1. The Netherlands
Since January 1, 1987, a model code of the Amsterdam
Stock Exchange has been in place to regulate insider trading in
the Netherlands.9 3 While the Code is strictly limited to com-
pany personnel, an important Dutch investment fund, Nether-
landse Participatie Maatschappij ("NPM"), has recently im-
posed insider trading restrictions on all its employees. 94 In ad-
dition, the Dutch Committee on Corporate Law has proposed
85. Insider Trading Guidelines, supra note 75, § 4, reprinted inJ. ROBINSON, supra
note 41, at 109.
86. Id.
87. Fisher, West German Shareholders' Body Calls for Insider Trading Curbs, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 1987, at 48. The shareholders association has recommended that
companies first coming to the market be required to accept the insider trading rules
in full. Id. In addition, the group has requested that the definition of insider be
expanded to include consultants, journalists, banks, and 25% shareholders. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Huizing, Netherlands: Some Developments on Insider Trading, INT'L FIN. L. REV.,
July 1987, at 45.
94. Id.
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adding a new section to the country's Penal Law that would
prohibit insider trading.9 5 Offenders would face imprisonment
for a maximum term of two years or a fine of up to D.fis.
100,000.96 If the profit made actually exceeds the statutory
fine, an amount equal to four times the amount of profit may
be assessed against the wrongdoer.97
2. Belgium
The Belgium Banking Commission has severely con-
demned insider trading as an infringement on the rule of pro-
fessional ethics.98 Some larger Belgian companies have intro-
duced self-imposed codes of conduct in this area.99 At pres-
ent, there is a bill before Parliament that would define insiders
as persons employed by a company and persons who have ac-
cess to inside information by virtue of their relationship to the
company.'0 0 Tippees would be liable if they acted as aiders
and abettors.' 0 ' Criminal sanctions would include a maximum
prison term of one year and a fine of up to 40,000B.fr. 10 2 An
insider could also be liable in a civil action for profits realized
or losses avoided as a result of the misconduct.'0°
3. Ireland
Legislation is being formulated in Ireland that would pro-
hibit insider trading in the Republic.' °4 The key provisions of
the proposal are not yet publicized. The opportunities for in-
sider trading in Ireland are likely to increase because of the
Republic's widespread campaign to encourage foreign invest-
ment. 10 5 The country's tremendous industrial growth has al-
95. Id.
96. 10A INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION
§ 8.11[2], at 8-28 (H. Bloomenthal ed. 1987) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
MARKETS].
97. Id.
98. 1OA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 96, § 8A.13[1], at 8A-47.
99. Id. at 8A-48.
100. Id. § 8A.13[2][b], at 8A-48.
101. Id. at 8A-48 to 8A-49.
102. Id. § 8A[2][e], at 8A-49.
103. Id.
104. COM(87) 111 final, supra note 5, at 2, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,880,
at 12,126.
105. Griffith, The Republic of Ireland's Foreign Investment, Licensing, and Intellectual
Property Law: A Guide for the Practitioner, 12 N.C.J. INT'L. & COM. REG. 1, 2 (1987).
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ready been stimulated by governmentally created aids and in-
centives, which include: tax breaks, training grants, loan guar-
antees, interest subsidies, research and development grants,
and cash grants.10 6
C. Insider Trading in the Remaining Member States
Despite the increased opportunities for insider trading in
Europe's newly globalized markets,'0 7 several European na-
tions have yet to impose insider restrictions. Luxembourg, for
instance, is quickly becoming one of the largest money havens
in the world.' 08 Foreign deposits have jumped forty percent
from 1986 to an estimated US$160 billion." 9 The European
Code of Ethics serves as the nation's sole control of insider
trading."t0 The Code of Ethics has been published in the Lux-
embourg Official Gazette, and is acknowledged by Luxem-
bourg's stock exchange."'
The Lisbon Stock Exchange, or Bolsa, has undergone a
resurgence under the management of the new chairman, Car-
los Rosa. 21 2 With eighteen new companies listed on the official
exchange in 1986 and forty on the unlisted securities ex-
change, Portugal's capital market appears to be reborn."'
However, despite these very positive signs, skepticism still ex-
ists in Portugal, where there are no insider trading prohibi-
tions and where "everyone in business has a useful friend
somewhere."'t 14
The Italian Stock Exchange has been characterized as a
106. Id.
107. See Internationalization of the Securities Market, supra note 1.
108. Finn & Pouschine, Luxembourg. Color It Green, FORBES, Apr. 20, 1987, at 42.
For decades, West German banks have kept about five percent of their money in
Luxembourg to capitalize on the Duchy's low reserve requirements and relaxed regu-
lations on commercial banking. Id. The recent influx of money, however, appears to
be coming from tax avoiders like shipping magnates and rock stars. Id. The country
is now neck and neck with Switzerland in this area and both are in reach of the Cay-
man Islands, the largest money haven in the world, with deposits of roughly US$200
billion. Id.
109. Id.
110. 1OA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 96, § 8B.13, at 8B-46.
11. Id.
112. Smith, Portugal, Banking and Finance 3; New Instruments Revitalise Sector, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1987, at 111.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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"scandal ridden bourse" in desperate need of reform." 5 In
March 1981, however, Guido Rossi was appointed to head the
Consob, Italy's securities enforcement body, and has since
made considerable progress in reforming this country's stock
exchanges. 16
Insider trading in Spain and Greece is also unregulated." 17
However, both countries are actively seeking foreign invest-
ment." s As the number of investors begins to increase so too
will the opportunities for insider abuse. The Socialist govern-
ment in Greece offers a choice of investment grants, interest
subsidies, loans, investment allowances, and accelerated de-
preciation."19 In Spain, the government introduced the Royal
Decree Liberalising Foreign Investments No. 1265 just five
days after the general elections on June 27, 1986.121 This De-
cree establishes a "regime of free investment," in line with the
Community rules on the freedom of movement of capital. 12 1
III. THE EEC'S PROPOSED DIRECTIVE:
A CRITICAL EVALUATION
Member States of the EEC clearly have different ideas as
to the regulation of insiders. The Commission's proposed di-
rective attempts to bring these ideas together by establishing
some minimum standards. While these standards provide a
starting point for creating uniformity, they will not be sufficient
to control insider trading effectively in the Community. Cur-
rent legislation in the United States offers a guide for compari-
son. However, it should be noted that the U.S. regulatory
agencies have had difficulty addressing the problem of insider
trading. 22
115. 10 INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 96, § 1.05[7], at 1-43.
116. Id.
117. Clark, Direct Foreign Investment: Greece, Spain and Portugal, 17 J. WORLD
TRADE 614 (1983).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Blackshaw, Liberalisation of Foreign Investments, 7 Bus. L. REV. 276 (1986). See
generally COM(87) 111 final, supra note 5, at 2, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,880,
at 12,126.
121. Blackshaw, supra note 120, at 276.
122. For instance, the Supreme Court recently reviewed the Second Circuit de-
cision in United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), where a I Vail Street
Journal reporter was found liable under a theory of misappropriation. See Carpenter
v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987). Reporter Winans authored the Journal's
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A. Some Strengths and Weaknesses
Perhaps the strongest point in the EEC proposed directive
is its broad definition of "insider."' 123 A narrower approach
would have excluded the tippee and focused primarily on
those insiders who are fiduciaries of the company whose shares
are in question. If investors are to be fully protected, anyone
who knowingly trades on the basis of inside information
should be sanctioned. To instill the European investor's confi-
dence in the securities markets, the EEC must not let the con-
duct of tippees go unregulated. At present, the United King-
dom has also included secondary insiders in its legislation. 24
France, on the other hand, has taken a different approach.
Only the insider who knowingly allows someone else to take
advantage of inside information will be prosecuted. 25
The Commission also provides a thorough definition of
the term "inside information."'' 26 The definition appears to
have incorporated the essential elements that are present in
existing Member State laws.' 27 The information must concern
the issuer or its securities and be likely to have a material effect
on the price of the security once it is publicly disclosed. 2 s The
French legislation provides a much more specific definition re-
quiring the information to refer to the technical, commercial,
or financial state of the company.' 29 The EEC wisely excluded
these elements from their definition. Although a simple
change in the management of a company can affect a com-
"Heard on the Street" column, which published weekly stock evaluations. Prior to
publishing his column, Winans would leak this information, sometimes through his
co-worker, David Carpenter, to Peter Brant, who would then invest for all three of
them. Id. at 318. The misappropriation theory emphasizes the "fraud and deceit"
language of rule 1Ob-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5
(1987), as opposed to the fiduciary duty theory's emphasis on "in connection with
the sale" language. The Supreme Court deadlocked, by 4 to 4, on this issue but ruled
8 to 0 upholding the conviction of Winans and two other men on federal mail and
wire fraud charges. See Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987).
123. See COM(87) Ill final, supra note 5, at 4, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,880, at 12,126.
124. Civil Liability Under the Financial Services Act, supra note 48, at 32, col. 4.
125. SeeJ. ROBINSON, supra note 41, at 127.
126. See COM(87) Ill final, supra note 5, at 5, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,880, at 12,126.
127. See supra notes 38-92 and accompanying text.
128. COM(87) 111 final, supra note 5, at 5, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,880,
at 12,126.
129. See Art. 10-1, supra note 56.
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pany's stock price, French law would probably not categorize
this type of information as privileged and price-sensitive.1 30
The price of an exchange-listed security should reflect a con-
sensus among investors as to the stock's fair value. It is there-
fore very important to supply investors with all relevant infor-
mation as soon as it becomes available.
The major weakness of the EEC's proposed directive oc-
curs in a very critical area: enforcement. One of the basic pol-
icy reasons behind the proposed directive is to encourage the
interpenetration of the national securities markets by provid-
ing that investors will be equally protected in each of the Mem-
ber States.' 3' Yet the proposal fails to establish guidelines so
that uniform sanctions will be imposed on those convicted of
insider trading. As a result, investors will face varying levels of
deterrence in each Member State. This disparity undermines
one of the guiding principles of the Common Market: the
elimination of discrimination on the basis of nationality. 132
The British Financial Services Act has added civil sanctions to
the penal sanctions that already existed in the country's Insider
Dealing Act.' 33 If insider trading is to be uniformly controlled
throughout the EEC both forms of punishment should be im-
posed.
B. Insider Trading in the United States
Much of the deterrent effect of U.S. regulation has evolved
from judicial interpretation of the antifraud provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.'1 4 A person is prohibited
130. Id.
131. COM(87) 111 final, supra note 5, at 2, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,880,
at 12,126.
132. Correlator, supra note 6, at 1007-08.
133. Civil Liability Under the Financial Services Act, supra note 48, at 6.
134. Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1982), allows a suit by an issuer against any "beneficial owner, director, or officer"
who realizes a profit on the sale or purchase of any equity security through the unfair
use of information. This section applies only to public corporations and involves
"short-term swing profits" made within a period of six months. Id. § 16(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(b).
Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act makes it unlawful to "use any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce ... to defraud or make an untrue state-
ment of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary to make the state-
ments made not misleading [or] to engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates .. . as a fraud or a deceit .... " 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
19881 449
450 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 11:432
from trading while in possession of material nonpublic infor-
mation if he owes a fiduciary duty of disclosure to one or more
contemporaneous traders in the marketplace. 35 The case law
has traditionally described insiders as officers and directors,
controlling shareholders, and employees of the issuer.' 3 6 Also
included are those persons who have entered into a special re-
lationship with the issuer, such as accountants, bankers, law-
yers, and underwriters.' 37 Tippees are held liable only if a fi-
duciary relationship exists.' 3  The Supreme Court of the
United States has held that a tippee "assumes a fiduciary duty
to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material
nonpublic information only when the insider has breached a
fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the informa-
tion to the tippee, and the tippee knows or should know that
there has been a breach."'' 3 9 The Court added an additional
factor: the tippee must also know or have reason to know that
the information was given to him for the personal benefit of
the insider. 40 Conversely, the EEC has chosen to downplay
the fiduciary aspect as well as the scienter requirement in its
proposed directive.' 4 ' This approach will allow investors the
greatest protection. The definitions of "inside information"
in the U.S. and the EEC are essentially the same. 142 The U.S.
has defined the concept as information that is nonpublic and
135. See Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella
Restatement, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982).
136. D. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING HANDBOOK 61-63 (1986).
137. Id. at 66-67. In the infamous footnote 14 of the Supreme Court decision in
Dirks v. SEC, "temporary insiders" of an issuer, that is, "those who enter into a spe-
cial relationship in the conduct of the business enterprise and are given access to
information solely for corporate purposes," also included persons who did not have
a formal relationship with the issuer. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
138. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660. The facts of the case involved an investment analyst
and a former employee of Equity Funding of America. The former employee told
Dirks that Equity Funding was being fraudulently managed and that the stock was
grossly overvalued. Id. Dirks subsequently investigated and publicized the fraud. Id.
Prior to publication, however, he contacted numerous persons, including his clients,
and told them to sell their Equity Funding shares. Id. at 648-50. The Supreme Court
held that tippee liability arises only when the tipper and the tippee join together in a
"co-venture" to exploit the information for personal gain. Id. The Court did not
find Dirks liable. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 662-64.
141. See COM(87) 111 final, supra note 5, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,880 at
12,126.
142. Id.
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material. 43  Material information is any information that
would be likely to cause a substantial change in the price of a
security. 144 This is similar to the EEC's definition of "price-
sensitive." The U.S. appears to have a great advantage over
the EEC in the field of enforcement. The regulatory frame-
work in the U.S. is evidence that a bigger arsenal can lead to
more effective enforcement. Under the Insider Trading Sanc-
tions Act of 1984, persons found guilty of insider trading face
penalties of up to three times the amount of profit made (or
losses avoided) as a result of the trading.1 45 This penalty is in
addition to a possible injunction or the possible disgorgement
of the actual profits made. 146 The U.S. Congress has estab-
lished criminal penalties for securities violations. A violator
can face a criminal sentence of up to five years in jail or a fine
of up to US$100,000.1 47 The EEC should follow the United
States' lead and impose similar sanctions so that insiders in the
EEC will face severe civil and criminal penalties wherever they
may illegally trade.
CONCLUSION
The European Commission has taken some very promis-
ing steps toward creating a unified financial market. The pro-
posed directive coordinating insider trading regulations will be
an essential component in a common European capital market.
The Council should move quickly in adopting this directive but
only after steps have been taken to ensure uniform deterrence
143. TSC Indus. v. Northway. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). In rare cases material-
ity will be at issue if the information in question suggested only a possibility of price
movement rather than substantial certainty. D. LANGEVOORT, supra note 136, at 126-
33.
144. D. LANGEVOORT, supra note 136, at 126-33.
145. Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 2, 98 Stat. 1264, 1264 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(d)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1986) (amending Securities Exchange Act § 21)).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). All damages recovered under
the Act go directly to the U.S. Treasury and the Act does not punish those who,
without scienter, aid or abet the purchase or sale of securities. Id. § 78u(d)(2)(B).
Those insiders who do not benefit from employing other defrauders are also not
punished. Id.
147. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
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throughout the Member States. Only then will investors be as-
sured of maximum protection throughout the Community.
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